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Drafting of the "Simple" Will
Ellis V. Rippner*
T HE SO-CALLED "SIMPLE" WILL is by far the most common type
of will drafted by the attorney. In jest it has been said to be
that legal instrument requested by the newly retired business man
who wishes to "place his house in order" prior to an extended
vacation. Double-parked in front of his attorney's office, he wants
the will drafted "instanter" so that he can start his trip with
"peace of mind." In fact, seldom does a client suggest that his
estate problem requires anything more than a "simple will." In
truth, however, no properly drafted will can properly be desig-
nated as "simple."
No two persons, at the time of drafting of their wills, have
identical problems. The "cloth" may be the same for each, but
the cut and style must of necessity vary. Precedents can be of
aid in the choice of phraseology, but the individual requirements
of each estate will dictate the specific form of will. This is the rea-
son why, in the construction of a will, prior decisions are of little
value. In most cases, courts are unwilling to construe a will in a
certain manner merely because in a previous case they have con-
strued a will containing similar expressions in that manner. To do
so may be to totally disregard the testator's real intention. For
example, a slight difference in language used by the testator may
indicate a great difference in his intention.' It follows, therefore,
that although precedents may aid in construction, they are not
the same controlling forces in respect to wills as in other branches
of the law.
The "simple" or "boilerplate" will often has been described
as "CC of CC"-"Commonly the Creator of Costly Complica-
tions."2
The draftsman's chief objective should be to see that, as far
as the law permits, the testator's desires shall be carried out. If
this is to be done and the estate saved the disastrous cost of
construction proceedings, the will must be made entirely clear.
Wills that are not long enough may be too simple and become
second only to "home-made" testaments as breeders of litigation.
A will must be adequate in length, artistry and explicitness in
order to say clearly what it means. If a will is even one word
shorter than this, it is "not long enough"!
* Instructor in the law of Wills and of Probate Practice and Procedure, at
Cleveland-Marshall Law School; Associate Editor of Deibel's Ohio Pro-
bate Law; formerly (for 23 years) Deputy Clerk and Commissioner of the
Probate Court of Cuyahoga County (Cleveland), Ohio; member of the law
firm of Rippner & Kest (Cleveland), specialist in probate matters.
1 2 Page on Wills, Sec. 914 (Lifetime ed. 1941); 41 Ohio Jur., Wills Sec.
457 (1935).
2 Am. Bar Association, Property Probate & Trust 99 (1953).
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When a client requests that a will be drafted wherein his
legatees and devisees inherit substantially in the same fashion as
they would under the statute of descent and distribution,3 the
scrivener's problems and precautions are minimized. Anything
descendable is devisable. 4 Thus, any property, right or interest
that would pass by operation of law may be disposed of by the
testator. However, if the testator wishes to prefer persons in an
order other than that provided by the statute of descent and dis-
tribution, 5 the "red light" of a possible will contest shines
brightly. Every precaution then should be taken in the drafting
of the will, in order to insure that the last wishes of the testator
are fulfilled.
First in the list of precautions is the principle that the "intro-
ductory clause" of the will should identify the testator by the
name which he most commonly uses to identify himself. The
name he uses on commercial accounts and savings passbooks is
generally conclusive for this purpose. However, if he has assets
held in any other variations of his name (e.g., using a full middle
name, or mere initials, or any aliases), these variations should be
fully disclosed in the introductory clause by the use of such
phrases as: "also known as," or "otherwise known as."
Stock transfer agents and the Treasury Department 6 require
certified copies of letters testamentary whenever assets are sold,
distributed in kind, redeemed or reissued. Unless the decedents'
names appear identical on the letters of appointment (testamen-
tary) to that which appears upon a particular asset, amended
letters containing the identical name must be secured.
This precaution is of particular importance where the title
name in real estate varies from that on letters testamentary, since
title companies generally require not only an amended certificate
but also republication of appointment under the title name.
Next, the testator should specifically set forth the name of
the city or town which he considers his permanent residence, in
order to assist the court in determining the question of domicile
should it be put in issue. Although the recital as to the testator's
domicile as suggested in his will is not conclusive, 7 his written
declarations generally outweigh his oral declarations.8 In the
absence of any other evidence to the contrary, a recital by the
testator as to residence will be controlling.9
The introductory clause of the will also should contain a
statement of testamentary capacity. In Ohio the requirements
3 Ohio Rev. Code, Sec. 2105.06.
4 Wagner et al. v. Schrembs, 44 Ohio App. 44, 184 N. E. 292 (1932).
5 Ohio Rev. Code, Sec. 2105.06.
6 U. S. Treas. Dept. Circular 530, Sec. 315.7-(b).
7 Renwick v. Macomber, 233 Mass. 530, 124 N. E. 670 (1919); See In re
Benson's Wills, 92 N. J. Eq. 618, appd. 93 N. J. Eq. 671 (1922).
8 In re Eaton's Will, 186 Wis. 124, 202 N. W. 309 (1925).
9 In re Costello's Will, 114 N. Y. S. 2d 525 (1952).
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for such capacity are that the testator be of "full age, sound mind
and memory and not under restraint." 10 Although the statement
is self-serving, it still is a declaration of the testator, tending to
show his thoughts regarding his mental capacity at the time of
the execution of the will, and as a general rule this statement is
admissible into evidence."' If the testator is physically ill, or is
making what is commonly known as a "death bed" will, I would
specifically suggest that in the introductory paragraph the place
where the will is being made (such as a hospital, convalescent
home or the like) and the conditions under which it is being
made, be set forth. This is in order to dispel the argument so
often made in an action to contest that had the testator been ap-
prised of the gravity of his condition, his will would have been
drawn otherwise.
The introductory clause should also specifically provide
for a revocation of all former wills or codicils in accordance with
the statute, Ohio R. C. 2107.33; otherwise the will at hand only
revokes the former will so far as the provisions of the later will
are inconsistent with the provisions of the former will.
12
The cardinal and unforgivable sin of the draftsman is am-
biguity. The attorney should set forth precisely what'conse-
quences the testator wishes to secure and not leave these to im-
plication. In the will of William B. Fuller, Chief Justice of the
United States Supreme Court, he devised "to his children or their
children, equal shares," thus creating a doubt whether they in-
herited per stirpes or per capita.
It is universally the law that "it is not what the testator is
presumed to have meant, but what he says." 13 When a will is
construed, the questions always in the mind of the court are not
what the testator should have done, but what did he do and what
did he mean by the words which he actually employed.
14
A simple precaution in this regard is to use the same phrases
or words throughout the will when you mean the same thing. If
you commence the will by identifying legatees and devisees by
their given names, continue to do so. Do not risk changing their
identity by saying "nieces and nephews" or similar phrases, in a
later portion of the instrument.
Use simple terms-language that your client, as a layman-
can comprehend. Omit unnecessary language. By all means
avoid the archaic phraseology. Use modern expressions that
cannot be misinterpreted.
Brevity and the economy of words are the mark of a good
draftsman. However, even here, in at least one instance, a pre-
10 Ohio Rev. Code, Sec. 2107.02.
11 Page, op. cit., supra, n. 1, Sec. 797.
12 I Page on Wills, Sec. 464 (Lifetime ed. 1941); see also Paully v. Crooks,
41 Ohio App. 1, 179 N. E. 364 (1931); Hennessy v. Volz, 59 Ohio App. 1, 16
N. E. 1019 (1938).
13 Smith v. Hunter, 86 Ohio St. 106 (1912).
14 Page, op. cit., supra, n. 1, Sec. 919; 41 Ohio Jur., Wills Sec. 468 (1935).
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caution must be observed. To illustrate-where the residuary
estate is left by parents to children, I recommend the clause:
"I give to my children equally. Should any of my children pre-
decease me, leaving child or children surviving, said child or
children shall take the share of the deceased parent as if the de-
ceased parent would have survived me." Brevity and economy in
words would best be served by stating "to my children per
capita or their lineal descendants per stirpes." The meaning
of the legal phraseology being so well defined that no interpreta-
tion would be necessary. 15 This brief phraseology would have
meant exactly the same without any interpretation to the bench
and the bar, but not to my client and his family. They generally
would require more of my time in explanation of the terms "per
capita" and "per stirpes" than the amount of time expended in
my being verbose in the drafting of the document.
Often, funeral arrangements are of concern to the testator.
In such situations, the scrivener should, if requested by his
client, specifically provide for the type and cost of his burial,
the funeral director, and the church of his choice. The testator
may further desire to provide specifically for the erection of,
and type of, tombstone. In absence of statutes to the contrary,
such provisions in the will are binding.16 In Ohio, payment for
tombstones or monuments, or for perpetual care, is expressly
permitted by statute.17
There is always a danger that because of lack of information
in a will burial instructions may be disregarded. Therefore, such
instructions should also be given orally or by letter by the tes-
tator to the members of his family as well as to the suggested
executor to avoid any problems.
A common request of a testator is for the disposition of his
body after death by way of cremation or for medical research, etc.
The validity of a provision in a will making proper disposition of
a testator's body has been upheld as not being against public
policy and it has been stated that great consideration must be
given to such wishes of the decedent.' 8
On this point, there is an early case in Ohio which follows
the minority rule holding that there is no property right in a
dead body and hence it cannot be disposed of by will. I doubt
whether we need fear this individual issue should the situation
arise, as long as the disposition by will of the body is in a manner
which is not shocking. It appears that consideration of the prop-
erty question causes unnecessary confusion, and that the solu-
tion lies in taking a more realistic view of the purpose of probate,
and in treating the expressed wish of the testator as an act of
15 3 Page on Wills, Sec. 1073, 1074 (Lifetime ed. 1941).
16 Thompson on Wills, Par. 9 (3rd ed. 1947).
17 Ohio Rev. Code, Sec. 2113.37.




testamentation not involving property at all.19 In cases of reli-
gious differences, the desires of a testator as to his burial have
been sustained. 20 If the testator is strong minded about the dis-
posal of his body because of religion, a clause in form of an in ter-
rorem provision can be included providing that if the testator's
desires are thwarted by a legatee or devisee, any gift in the will
to such person shall fail. I know of no case "on all fours" with
this proposition but it would appear to be a valid "condition
precedent" to the right of inheritance, unless the arrangements
requested are held invalid for other reasons. In such cases, for
complete protection, a letter of instructions should be sent to
the proper parties at the time of the drafting of the will, and a
copy of the letter attached to the will; otherwise lack of knowl-
edge of testator's wishes might be a defense for non-compliance.
It is common practice for a testator to request that memorial
prayers be said for the "repose of his soul" and the souls of de-
ceased members of his family. In such situations the number, the
type of prayers, the amounts to be expended therefor, and the
length of time the prayers shall continue must be spelled out
by the scrivener. It has been settled by a practically unanimous
agreement of authorities that a bequest for the saying of masses
is not invalid.2 1 Trusts for the purposes of saying of masses have
been sustained in Ohio.22 Recently in Ohio, by statutory amend-
ment, gifts to establish religious organizations have been relieved
from the lien of Ohio inheritance taxes.2 3
A direction in the will for the payment of "just debts, funeral
expenses and costs of last sickness" is unnecessary and should
be eliminated, for generally statutes specifically provide for the
priority of payment of debts and that priority cannot be varied
by the language of the will. 24 Further, a general direction to
pay debts may raise a question as to the fund to be charged,25
and may further create an ambiguity as to whether the testator
was directing the executor to pay debts outlawed by a statute
of limitation because the clause may be construed as a direction to
the representative to waive the defense.20 A "just" debt might
well be an unenforceable debt. Although it appears to be the
general rule that such a provision in the will is meaningless where
there is a statute making the payment of the testator's just debts
mandatory, and the provision applied only to enforceable obliga-
19 See Recent Cases: Wills-Right of Testator to Direct Disposal of Body
After Death, 87 U. Pa. L. R. 360 (1938).
20 Guerin Cassidy, 38 N. J. Super. 454, 119 A. 2d 780 (1955); In re Riegler
Estate, 32 N. Y. S. 168 (1895).
21 10 Am. Jur., Carriers Sec. 59.
22 Lanza v. DeFranzo, 41 Ohio Op. 390, 92 N. E. 2d 299 (1949).
23 Ohio Rev. Code, Sec. 5731.09 (effec. Aug. 20, 1957).
24 Ibid., Sec. 2117.25; also see 4 Page on Wills, Sec. 1475 (Lifetime ed. 1941).
25 Id., at Sec. 1477.
20 Ritchie III, Drafting Simple Will for Moderate Estate, Am. Bar Associa-
tion, Probate & Trust Law Division 4 (1952).
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tions,27 which has been followed in Ohio,28 such provisions raise
questions of doubt, serve no useful purpose, and should be aban-
doned. On the other hand, if the testator wishes to relieve a gift
from the payment of Ohio inheritance taxes, or to relieve the
residuary estate from the payment of federal estate taxes or to
provide out of the estate for the payment of federal estate taxes
on taxable non-probate assets, such provisions should be spelled
out with certainty and not left to the court's interpretation. 29
In those wills where the testator wishes to leave his entire
estate to his spouse, the usual plan of the young married couple,
generally the main asset is the mansion house. In such circum-
stances the failure of the scrivener to follow the statute R. C.
2107.34, which provides for the disinheritance of "afterborn or
pretermitted heirs," is a grave omission. Failure to specifically
disinherit or make other provision therefor, gives the afterborn,
adopted, etc., heir such right as he would have had, had the testa-
tor died intestate.30 Whether to write such a provision in the will
might be a subject of delicate discussion with your client. If your
client is a young couple, inclusion "goes without saying." If the
couple is elderly, the provision can be excluded. It is the border-
line case which causes the complications. When in doubt, use
the provision, on the theory that where "there's life there's hope."
The omission of the "disinheritance" provision might not be dis-
covered if the estate of the deceased spouse consists only of per-
sonal property. However, title companies daily are refusing to
issue title guarantees because the real estate left by the deceased
spouse is clouded as a result of the failure to specifically "dis-
inherit." The omission cannot be corrected during the minority
of the minor except by guardian's land sale. Further complica-
tions have arisen where the children who were not specifically
"disinherited," now adults, wish to quit-claim to their parent but
find that their respective spouses will not sign away their dower
interests. The disinheritance provision is difficult to explain to
clients, especially if it disinherits only the afterborn or adopted
children. It is for that reason that I suggest you disinherit both
those in being as well as afterborn. It is so seldom that a client
is considering designating an heir after the execution of the will
or has "a child as designated heir who is absent and reported to
be dead . . ." (Ohio R. C. 2107.34) that I make no reference
herein to them; although in a proper case, reference to them
should be included.
27 97 C. J. S., Wills Sec. 1312.
28 Devers v. Schrieber, 50 Ohio App. 442, 198 N. E. 601 (1935); Estate of
Carrington, 73 Ohio L. Abs. 381 (1956).
29 Tax Commission of Ohio v. Lamprecht, 107 Ohio St. 535, 140 N. E. 333
(1923); In re Estate of Gatch, 153 Ohio St. 401, 92 N. E. 2d 404 (1950); Mc-
Dougall v. Central National Bank of Cleveland, 157 Ohio St. 45, 104 N. E.
2d 441 (1952); In re Bingham's Estate, 60 Ohio L. Abs. 202, 100 N. E. 2d
870 (1950).
30 57 Am. Jr., Wills Sec. 573; Evans v. Anderson, 15 Ohio St. 324, 2 Ohio
Dec. Reprint 502 (1864); Ash v. Ash, 9 Ohio St. 383 (1859).
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol8/iss2/13
CLEVELAND-MARSHALL LAW REVIEW
Frequently the intentions of a testator have been thwarted
by the failure of the scrivener to provide for alternate legatees
or devisees where the prime object of the testator's bounty pre-
deceased the testator or died within thirty days after testator's
death.31 This omission was dramatically disclosed recently where
a husband and wife had made mutual wills but made no pro-
visions over if one predeceased the other. As a result of a plane
crash, both were killed. In the instant case, the husband some
forty years before had married the woman who had three children
then all under seven years of age. For some reason he had never
adopted these children, although they had taken his name and
there was a mutual love and deep family affection. As a result
of the failure to provide for a second beneficiary, his estate,
which was over $400,000.00, went under the law of intestate
succession3 2 to first cousins once and twice removed and of whose
existence he was not even aware, while her smaller estate of about
$60,000.00 went to her children.
Although the statute prevents a lapse where the gift is made
to a relative leaving issue,3 3 the fact remains that often it is not
the desire of the testator to prefer the issue of a deceased relative.
In Ohio an adopted child is considered issue under this statute,34
while a husband or wife, though next of kin under the statute,3 5
is not considered relative.3 6
I believe it essential, therefore, that every testator be ad-
vised what disposition would be made of his property in the event
the prime object of his gift should predecease him or die within
thirty days of his death. It is my suggestion that he provide for
a first and second alternate beneficiary. In other words, I feel that
a good draftsman should carry the succession of each gift at least
three steps.
If you have the rare situation where a client desires to leave
a gift to a person of his blood who has been adopted by a blood
stranger, you must, under the present statute, identify ". . . such
child by his adopted name or later acquired name."'37 This
statute is unreasonable inasmuch as you might have a situation
where the testator wishes to make a gift to a child adopted and,
because of the statute providing that the record of adoption is not
open for inspection,3" be without knowledge as to the adopted
child's newly acquired name. The statute relative to inheritance
31 Ohio Rev. Code, Sec. 2105.21.
32 Ibid., Sec. 2105.06(g).
33 Ibid., Sec. 2107.52.
34 Flynn v. Breddecker, 147 Ohio St. 49, 68 N. E. 2d 75 (1946).
35 Ohio Rev. Code, Sec. 2105.06.
36 Schafer v. Bernhardt, 76 Ohio St. 443, 81 N. E. 640 (1907); Reformed
Church of Union Town v. Wise, 17 Ohio C. C. R. (1896); Norwood v. Mills,
1 Ohio N. P. 314 (1895).
37 Ohio Rev. Code, Sec. 3107.13.
38 bid., Sec. 3107.14.
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of an adopted child being strictly construed3 9 means that a gift to
"the child of my daughter who has been adopted," without spe-
cifically mentioning the adopted name, would fail.
Frequently the desired aims of a well meaning testator fail
because he bases his general bequests on the value of his estate
at the time of the execution of the will, which might be sub-
stantially more than its valuation at the time of death. In such
situations, the residuary legatee or legatees who are frequently
the prime object of the testator's bounty suffer because of the full
payment of these bequests.
This result can be prevented by inserting in the will a sug-
gested maximum amount for the general bequests with an added
provision stating a fixed ratio between the total of the general
bequest and the residuary estate. It is usually accomplished by
a percentage formula providing that the general bequests "shall
be no greater than a specified amount, but in no event greater
than a certain percentage of the net distributable estate."
Special care also should be given in making a specific devise
or bequest. For if the object in the gift is not an asset of the
estate at the time of the death of the testator, it is adeemed, and
the legatee will have no claim against the estate for any other
comparable item or for money equaling the value of the adeemed
gift.40 Therefore, it might be wise to provide, in certain instances,
that certain general items in possession at the time of death be
subject to the gift.
A surviving parent may, by will, designate a testamentary
guardian,4 1 who may be a non-resident of the State.42 By recent
amendment, the surviving parent may name the same person
both executor and guardian.4 3
I have found this often the persuasive argument in convincing
a wife, with minor child or children, who is otherwise unin-
terested, of the necessity of the drafting of her will as well as
the will of her husband. She thus can be assured that in the
event her husband predeceases her, her minor children will be
kept together as a family unit by a testamentary guardian of her
choice. Prior to the making of such a designation, the person
to be designated should be contacted by the parents to ascertain
whether he or she will act. The will should also provide for a
successor guardian in the event the person designated fails to
qualify, or having qualified, fails to complete the guardianship.
Many times a situation arises where the client is divorced
and hence a designation by him of a guardian, if the other parent
be alive at his death, would be ineffective, 44 yet he wishes to be
89 Campbell v. Musart Society, 72 Ohio L. Abs. 46, 131 N. E. 2d 279 (1956).
40 Bool v. Bool, 165 Ohio St. 262, 135 N. E. 2d 372 (1956); page, op. cit., supra,
n. 24, Sec. 1517; 41 Ohio Jur., Wills Sec. 738 (1935).
41 Ohio Rev. Code, Sec. 2111.12.
42 Ibid., Sec. 2109.21.
43 Ibid., Sec. 2111.09 (passed 9/4/57).
44 In re Coons, 20 Ohio C. C. R. 47 (1899).
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assured that the divorced spouse will not handle the funds be-
queathed to the guardian of the estate of the minors. The same
situation arises when the testator, not a parent, wishes to make a
gift to minors and he feels the natural parents would be unsuit-
able to act as guardians of the funds which are the subject of the
gift. The vehicle to use in such situation is to appoint a testa-
mentary trustee wherein the rights and duties and the results
desired should be detailed with exactness. In such situations, al-
though the natural parents, if suitable, could secure an appoint-
ment as guardians of the minors' estate, their claim upon the fund
held in trust for the benefit of the minors would be limited so
long as the trustee did not abuse his discretion in administration
of the trust. In such situations, I provide that the amount of pay-
ments made for the benefit of the minors be determined by first
taking into consideration the minors' sources of other income.
It is not always advisable to appoint the principal object of
the testator's bounty, whether it be the surviving spouse, or
another, as the executor. The testator should consider his close-
ness to the party being designated as executor, his honesty, his
integrity, his astuteness, and the confidence the beneficiaries place
in him. It goes without saying that the executor should be the
person in whom the testator has the utmost confidence, the per-
son whom he would consider his "alter ego," for the real heart of
the will is often the executor. Many times, even though the wife
is the sole legatee and devisee, her lack of familiarity with busi-
ness, together with the emotional upset following as the result of
the spouse's death, makes her a poor choice for executrix.
It is wise to provide for an alternate executor to qualify, in
the event the named executor fails to qualify, or having qualified
fails to complete the administration of the estate. Next, give the
named executor adequate powers and, further, where confidence
dictates, provide that bond be dispensed with in order to save
costs. The maximum premium allowable to the fiduciary on his
account is regulated by statute.45 No bond is required if a cor-
porate trustee is appointed even though bond is not dispensed with
in the will.
46
An "in terrorem" clause, the validity of which is well estab-
lished generally,47 and the principle of which is adhered to by
the courts in Ohio,48 will go far to discourage a dissatisfied heir-
at-law from contesting if the amount bequeathed to him is suf-
ficient, taking into consideration the size of the distributable
estate, to place him in a position of a "half loaf being better than
none." I say "sufficient" because recently the heirs in a case were
not so discouraged where they were bequeathed $200.00 each, and
where the will set aside their inheritance under the law of intes-
45 Ohio Rev. Code, Sec. 3929.15.
46 Ibid., Sec. 1107.14.
47 57 Am. Jur., Wills Sec. 1512; see No-Contest Will Clauses: A Comment,
24 U. of Chi. L. R. 672 (1957).
48 41 Ohio Jur., Wills Sec. 711 (1935).
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tate succession would have been $200,000.00. So in the "in ter-
rorem" clause, grant an amount large enough to the beneficiary
who is expected to cause trouble so that he will think twice before
he forfeits what he already has. In all cases, whether an "in ter-
rorem" clause is used or not, name the next of kin, so as to dis-
pense with the suggestion, in the event of a contest, that the testa-
tor was not aware of the identity of his next of kin.49 The testator
should spell out the reasons for the disinheritance or limitation of
gifts to the heirs-at-law, in the kindest but strongest language,
keeping in mind that the original will goes to the jury room for
deliberation. Be sure, in giving reasons for failure to adequately
provide for those persons who have a right to contest,50 that the
language used will not subject the estate to a suit for libel. Since
the probating of a will with a libelous statement in it perpetuates
the defamation upon the public records, an action for damages will
lie against the estate, and the one defamed may petition for the de-
letion of the libelous matter.51
In proper cases, a spendthrift trust should be created to pro-
tect a legatee against his own indiscretions. 5 2 However, claims
of a particular kind, such as for alimony or for maintenance or
support, may be effective against spendthrift clauses.
Recently, two Common Pleas Courts of Ohio have taken op-
posite views on the right to attachment of funds held under
spendthrift trusts. 53
Often, the testator is fearful of a successful contest of his
will even though the aforesaid precautions have been taken. In
this situation, it is the scrivener's duty to advise the testator of
an Ohio statute which, though it may be far afield of subject at
hand, can in certain cases guarantee the desired results. Though
surprisingly rarely invoked, this statute affords a practical method
for accomplishing the "assured" inheritance. Its application is
unlimited. Its protection is boundless. Its procedure is simple,
and its liabilities are most limited.5 4 If properly complied with,
this statute affords protection that no will can insure. It pro-
vides for the designation of an heir, and places the person desig-
nated, for the purpose of inheritance, as if he were "a child born
in lawful wedlock." 55 With this definition in mind, let us ex-
plore the potentialities of the statute. Suppose that a client has
no children, adopted children, or their lineal descendants. Her
49 Niems v. Niems, 97 Ohio St. 145, 119 N. E. 503 (1917).
50 Ohio Rev. Code, Sec. 2741.01.
51 Page, op. cit., supra, n. 24, Sec. 1768. See, Libel In a Will: A Comment,
24 Fordham L. R. 417 (1955).
52 37 Ohio Jur., Spendthrift Sec. 2 (1935).
53 McWilliams v. McWilliams, 74 Ohio L. Abs. 535, 140 N. E. 2d 80 (1956);
O'Connor v. O'Connor, 75 Ohio L. Abs. 420, 141 N. E. 2d 691 (1957).
54 Rippner, Wills Can Be Made "Unbreakable," 6 Clev.-Mar. L. R. 336
(1957).
55 Ohio Rev. Code, Sec. 2105.15.
10https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol8/iss2/13
CLEVELAND-MARSHALL LAW REVIEW
husband has predeceased her. She has a friend who has been
most conscious of her welfare. She desires to insure that this
particular person shall receive whatever estate she leaves upon
her death as against brothers and sisters, her next of kin. During
her lifetime, she is not interested in establishing a gift program,
perhaps being reluctant to do so because of the size of her estate.
By conferring the designation of "heir" upon the party whom she
wishes to be the major beneficiary of her bounty, she can leave
specific and general bequests to others, and leave the residue of
her estate to the designated heir. The effect of this statute thus
appears to be a case of "all to gain and nothing to lose" for the
testator.
Aside from deterring will contests, the statute providing for
the designation of an heir is also beneficial from the standpoint
of inheritance taxes levied by the State of Ohio. A designated
heir has a $3,500.00 exemption and the tax on his inheritance be-
gins at 1%. A stranger has no exemption, and his tax rate starts
at 7%. This fact is most important, for it may well be the "selling
point" to a doubting client. The client has created no irrevocable
obligation by making the designation, but on the other hand can
partially "disinherit" the State of Ohio as a beneficiary. To il-
lustrate, let us assume that there remains on hand for distribu-
tion $23,500.00. To a stranger, there would be a 7% Ohio in-
heritance tax, in the sum of $1,645.00. A designated heir would
pay a tax of but 1%, or $200.00, a savings of $1,445.00.5 1
Thus the benefits of Ohio Sec. 2105.15 can be summarized as
follows: In a case where there are no surviving spouse, children
or adopted children, nor their lineal descendants, the designated
heir will inherit all under the law of intestate succession. Hence,
no next of kin by blood can file an action to contest the will, since
he is not as such "an interested party" within the statute.57 The
designator still has the right to leave property by will to others
in all or in part, or to disinherit the designated heir; and if it
should be found desirable after a year, he may set aside the desig-
nation. The statute makes the "choice" so simple, adequate, and
protective. Every objective can be accomplished, plus the saving
of big tax dollars.
In line with the provision relative to designation of heirs, as
a result of a 1953 amendment of the Ohio Revised Code,58 an
illegitimate child can be deemed legitimate and be considered as
one born in lawful wedlock by the filing and granting of an ap-
plication in Probate Court.
Now, let us consider another aspect of the construction of a
will. In an action to contest a will, the jury must be apprised that
the sole issue for determination is whether the writing produced
is the "last will or codicil of the testator." 59 Therefore, the jurors
56 Tbid., Sec. 5731.09-12.
57 Ibid., Sec. 2741.01.
58 Ibid., Sec. 2105.18.
59 Ibid., Sec. 2471.04.
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are further instructed that the will must be sustained in its en-
tirety or fail in its entirety.
Having feet of "common clay," jurors not only consider the
evidence but can't help considering the fairness or unfairness of
the provisions of the will which they have before them, although
that which is admissible in evidence does not in and of itself
affect the validity of the will.60 Who are the beneficiaries and
who will suffer if the will is set aside? Gifts to charities might
well cause a jury to sustain a will without which the result might
be otherwise. Therefore, in a particular case it might well be
that gifts to religious or racial denominations or charities would
be the determining factor in having a will sustained. After all,
only nine of the jury members must concur in the decision.6 1
Rather than call this "legal chicanery," let us say the jury is "kill-
ing two birds with one stone"-the disinheriting of an heir-at-law
on the one hand and the helping of charity-on the other. How-
ever, if the charitable gifts are out of proportion to the amounts
given to the next of kin, it might have an opposite effect because
of the "charity-begins-at-home" theory. Often, we have jurors
who remember that they themselves, or their families or friends,
have been "disinherited" because of charitable-minded ancestors.
The "bad taste" for large charitable contributions has stayed with
them.
Occasionally, we have a client who is a collector, and by will,
wishes to make bequests of numerous items to various friends.
In such a situation, rather than expending the time to have the
bequest enumerated to the scrivener, or to make an unnecessarily
lengthy document, it might be well to have the client at his leisure
set forth his desires in a separate instrument. As long as the
instrument is in existence at the time the will is executed and is
properly identified in the will, it can be incorporated by reference
as specifically provided by statutory authority in Ohio. 2
Therefore, provide specifically for the dispensing of appraisal
of the household goods and furniture by exercising the right given
by statute; 63 otherwise, it has been held that each and every
article must be meticulously listed. 64
If your client is operating a business at the time of the draft-
ing of the will, or is contemplating the acquisition of a business,
whether it be incorporated or unincorporated, it is generally wise
to give to the named executor, along with his general powers, the
specific right to continue business, spelling out in detail the dis-
cretionary rights you wish him to have in its continued operation
and possible sale or liquidation. Without this authority, the ex-
ecutor can only continue the business for thirty days. Then only
60 57 Am. Jur., Wills Sec. 106; 41 Ohio Jur., Wills Sec. 77 (1935).
61 Ohio Rev. Code, Sec. 2315.09; 41 Ohio Jur., Wills Sec. 406 (1935).
62 Ibid., Code, Sec. 2107.05; Page, op. cit. supra, n. 12, Sec. 249.
63 Ibid., Code, Sec. 2115.08.
64 In re Estate of McConney, 70 Ohio App. 286, 51 N. E. 2d 239 (1942).
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upon application and giving of notice and with the approval of
the Probate Court may he continue. 05 The statute further pro-
vides that the executor then must file monthly reports in the
Probate Court showing all receipts and expenses and other
pertinent information which the court may require. Not only is
tion of business, but he encounters the filing of the monthly re-
the executor limited to certain statutory restrictions in the opera-
ports which are public record. This gives notice to the world, and
specifically to his competitors, of the secrets of the firm's opera-
tions, to the obvious detriment of the business. I suggest that the
authority to continue the business, as outlined above, be given
to the executor even though the business be a corporation where
the controlling shares are in the estate, for in such situations, it
is questionable whether the executor has a right to continue the
operation of business without court order.°6
If the testator is a member of a partnership, be sure to check
the articles of partnership to be certain that they provide for dis-
position of the partnership on death. Otherwise, do so specifically
by will, providing, in addition, that the inventory and appraisal
of partnership assets be dispensed with.6 7
Should your client have property over which he has the
power of appointment, the property which is being given should
be specifically identified, for it is held in Ohio that the exercise of
the power must thereunder be clearly apparent, otherwise the
property will not pass.66
If you have such confidence in your non-corporate executor
that you wish to authorize him individually to have dealings with
the estate, you should provide so specifically in the will. Then,
and only with the approval of the Probate Court, can the execu-
tor act accordingly. 69
In a will, you can further expressly authorize your individual
or corporate executor to make advancements. 70 The advance-
ment provision is often advantageous to the estate in order to
forestall the selling of assets at a sacrifice in order to pay debts
and taxes.
If the testator wishes his surviving spouse to receive only
what she is given under the will, he should specifically state that
the gift to her shall be in lieu of her year's allowance, 71 in lieu
65 Ohio Rev. Code, Sec. 2113.30.
66 33 C. J. S., Executor & Administrators Sec. 193, 194; Pfeiffer v. Michigan
Trust Co., 275 Mich. 237, 266 N. W. 368 (1936); In re Estate of Louis F.
Nonnast, 300 IIl. App. 537, 21 N. E. 2d 796 (1939); Nonnast v. Northern
Trust Company, 374 Ill. 248, 29 N. E. 2d 251 (1940).
67 Ohio Rev. Code, Sec. 1779.08.
68 Bishop v. Remply, 11 Ohio St. 277 (1860); Arthur v. Odd Fellows, 29
Ohio St. 557 (1876); Kepplinger v. Armstrong, 34 Ohio St. 348, 171 N. E.
245 (1930).
69 Ohio Rev. Code, Sec. 2109.44.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid., Sec. 2117.20.
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of property exempt from administration, 72 and use of the mansion
house.73 Failure to so provide gives her these statutory rights as
well as the property under the will.7 4 It should be noted that a
husband, in no event, is entitled to a year's allowance.
Although a spouse has the statutory right to elect against the
will,7 5 this right must be exercised within nine months or she is
conclusively presumed, subject to exceptions under certain fact
situations, to take under the will.70 However, even if the spouse
fails to make the election against the will within nine months,
the widow would still be allowed the statutory exemptions, year's
allowance, use of the mansion house and exempted estate unless
the will provides otherwise.
Hence, if you have the rare situation where your client wishes
to disinherit his spouse or give the wife a most nominal gift in
lieu of the use of the mansion house and year's allowance and
property exempt for administration, and if she doesn't elect
within the required nine-month period, it would appear to fol-
low that she would also lose her statutory rights, having been
"conclusively presumed to take under the will." 77 I know of no
case where this question has been resolved, but it is worth a try.
It is a "must" that the attorney who drafts the will always
shall act as one of the witnesses, so that in the event of a contest
he can testify fully as to the conversation with the decedent and
the incidents leading up to and surrounding the execution. 78
Being a witness to the will, he is not barred by the attorney-client
privilege statute,79 for the courts have held that where an at-
torney is a witness to a will, the testator has impliedly waived the
privilege.s° The attorney should not be forced to sit idly by while
the contestant proves that the will is the result of "undue in-
fluence" or "mental incompetence" when the attorney himself
possesses the facts which absolutely refute the contestant's case.8 '
However, if the attorney who drafts the will is to be named
the executor, it is still a "must" as aforesaid, that he act as one
of the witnesses, but he should further have at least two other
qualified witnesses subscribe to its execution.
Although it has been held that a witness-executor or wit-
ness-trustee is not an incompetent subscribing witness,8 2 the
72 Ibid., Sec. 2115.13.
73 Ibid., Sec. 2117.24.
74 Ibid., Sec. 2107.42.
75 Ibid., Sec. 2107.39.
76 In re Estate of Bersin, 98 Ohio App. 432, 129 N. E. 2d 868 (1955).
77 Ohio Rev. Code, Sec. 2107.41.
78 Rippner, op. cit., supra, n. 54.
79 Ohio Rev. Code, Sec. 2317.02.
80 Knepper v. Knepper, 103 Ohio St. 529, 134 N. E. 476 (1921).
s1 Platz, The Competency of Attorneys and Physicians To Disclose Privi-
leged Communication In Testamentary Cases, 1939 Wis. L. R. 339.
82 Blanker v. Lathrop, 154 N. E. 2d 95 (Ohio, 1958); Fazeka v. Gobozy, 78




question may arise wherein his appointment is attacked in the
Probate Court on the grounds of suitability.8 3 Though it has been
suggested that, as a matter of professional ethics, a lawyer should
not be a subscribing witness where he has been named as execu-
tor and/or trustee under a will,8 4 it is the primary duty of the
attorney-scrivener to take all ethical precautions to sustain the
wish of the testator. I suggest emphatically that where the at-
torney-scrivener is an object of the testator's bounty, the will
should be drafted by some other attorney who is in no way as-
sociated with the scrivener, in order to avoid all suggestion of
"undue influence."
Often, the testator wishes to insure the proper administra-
tion of his estate by designating counsel to act as attorney of
record for the estate. By great weight of authority,8 5 which is
followed in Ohio,86 an executor and trustee is not bound to em-
ploy the designated attorney. One of the reasons suggested is
that a fiduciary shall not be hampered in the management of the
estate's affairs by being forced to work with an attorney not of
his own choosing. Should a testator feel so keenly about the de-
sirability of suggesting the attorney to represent his estate, but
not wishing to designate him as executor or co-executor, it might
be feasible to make the executor's appointment a condition prece-
dent on his designating the suggested counsel as attorney of rec-
ord. The enforceability of such a condition is open to question,
but it is another "all to gain" provision.
Each page of the will should bear the signature or initials of
the testator and the date, in order to avoid any suggestion of
substitution of pages.
A "made to order" attestation clause is all important, for,
besides being strong evidence that the will was properly ex-
ecuted,8 7 it serves as an authoritative memorandum to refresh
the memories of the subscribing witnesses. It should contain a
recital that all statutory requirements have been fulfilled. It
should recite the number of pages of which the will consists. It
should contain the date for the obvious reason that it determines
whether it be the last will. If there are any erasures or correc-
tions, they should be referred to in the attestation clause, as well
as being initialed where made by the testator; otherwise, the
presumption is that they were made after the execution and
83 Ohio Rev. Code, Sec. 2113.05.
84 Prothero v. Davies, 149 Kan. 720, 89 Pac. 2d 890 (1939).
85 Scott, Testamentary Direction to Employ, 41 Harv. L. Rev. 709 (1927);
See Recent Decisions: Wills-Direction to Employ Certain Attorney For
Probate, 36 Marq. L. R. 211 (1952).
86 Sherrnick, 19 Ohio L. Abs. 461 (1935); See Recent Cases: Attorney-Testa-
mentary Directions to Employ-Wills, 10 U. Cin. L. R. 104 (1936); Contra;
Rivet v. Batteslella, 167 La. Ann. 766, 120 So. 289 (1929); In re Johnson, 199
L. Ann. 743, 7 So. 2d 40 (1942).
87 Thompson, op. cit., supra, n. 16, Par. 132; Also In re Shultz Estate, 102
Ohio App. 486, 136 N. E. 2d 730 (1956).
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hence of no effect.8 8 However, in all cases where time per-
mits and there is no emergency, retype the will or pages rather
than correct, interlineate or change by hand. If the testator is
under any physical disability, as aforesaid, suggest the same in
the attestation clause to show that the witnesses, as well as the
testator, were apprised of the testator's physical condition at the
time of execution of the will. Testimony of the subscribing wit-
nesses at the time of contest affirming that the testator had testa-
mentary capacity, though physically disabled, is merely a re-
affirmance of their previous statement at the time of attestation
and should have certain probative value for the jury.
The witnessing of the will is all important because generally
it is the witnesses' disinterested testimony which is the determin-
ing fact considered by a jury in an action to contest. In cases
where the "red light" of contest hovers, the witnesses should
never be persons who, after a casual introduction to the testator,
are asked to act as subscribing witnesses. The ideal situation is
to have as witnesses, person of long acquaintance, younger than
the testator, and who probably will survive him. Practically
speaking, it is wise to choose persons who will probably be avail-
able to testify when the will is presented to be probated. In-
telligent and forthright people who know the provisions of the
will and the reasons they are so made, make the most desirable
witnesses.
As previously suggested, this type of witnesses' testimony
will go far in sustaining the will. If, however, the securing of
such witnesses is not feasible and associate counsel or employees
in your office are available, do more than have their meeting
with the testator a casual "howdy do." Explain to the client the
importance of the testimony of these witnesses in the event of a
contest, in order that they may engage your client in conversa-
tion to determine for themselves his or her testamentary capacity.
A noonday luncheon prior to the execution of the will is a sug-
gested procedure. The witnesses can then make written notes as
to their opinions and place their findings with the conformed
copy of the will retained by the scrivener.
I suggest using a minimum of three witnesses, though only
two need appear in Probate Court and offer their testimony.8 9 In
the event of a contest, the third witness might add much to assist
the will being sustained; on probate, one of the witnesses' testi-
mony might not be easy to secure and the testimony of the re-
maining two will suffice.
When the testator is in the hospital, the attending physician
or nurses will generally offer their full cooperation in describing
"testator's condition" so as to leave the witnesses with no mental
reservations as to the testator's testamentary capacity.
88 Brundige v. Benton, 9 Ohio Dec. Reprint 786 (1887); Page, op. cit., supra,
n. 1, Sec. 887.
89 Ohio Rev. Code, Sec. 2107.14.
16https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol8/iss2/13
CLEVELAND-MARSHALL LAW REVIEW
If the testator, as the result of his disability, is without voice,
handwritten notes of instruction written by the testator should
be shown to the witnesses and kept with the will to establish that
it was drawn in accordance with the testator's request and de-
sires.
If you have a situation where a testator, though under
guardianship, is lucid, I suggest the use of at least two phychia-
trists as witnesses. On examining your client prior to the execu-
tion of the will, they should make written findings of their diag-
nosis, the originals of which you will attach to the will. The law
recognizes that a will executed in a lucid interval by one who
was before and afterwards, a confirmed lunatic, is valid.90 When
the question of lucid intervals is pertinent, it becomes especially
advisable for the physician to be present at the specific time the
will is being discussed by testator. Attorneys too often fail to
take advantage of the opportunity of having a psychiatrist pres-
ent at such time if they anticipate a possible contest concerning
testamentary capacity. The phychiatrist can also serve as an
advisor to the attorney by pointing out when rare lucid intervals
can be expected for the particular testator, e.g., the phenomenon
of mental fatigue in senile individuals would make it appear
advisable to execute the will early in the day.9 1 In addition to
the professional medical witness, I would have, other than the
scrivener, three witnesses of long acquaintanceship with the testa-
tor.
A voice recorder is an excellent instrument to use to fully
record the statements made at the time of the execution of the
will and its use as evidence has been sustained by the Supreme
Court of Illinois; 92 the court there held that the recording is a
mechanical rather than a human witness and that this should not
render the evidence incompetent, provided a proper foundation
is laid for its admission. In such cases, I suggest the use of a wire
or tape that can record for at least an hour, so as to avoid the
possible necessity of changing. In using the recording, have the
testator and witnesses identify themselves audibly. Then, have
the testator proceed to read the will and have its contents dis-
cussed at length with the witnesses with whom he acquaints in
detail the reasons for the preferring or disinheriting of parties.
As he signs the will, he indicates what he is doing, as do the wit-
nesses. At no time is the instrument turned off until the record-
ing is completed.
Even if the tape is held inadmissible, it would go far in re-
freshing the memories of the witnesses to the will and even in an
office preview might discourage a contestant or his attorney if
the "dead were to speak" indicating his reason for the partial or
total disinheritance of the contestant.
90 In re Will of Ruth M. Cox, 139 Me. 261, 29 A. 2d 281 (1942).
91 Usdin, The Psychiatrist and Testamentary Capacity, 32 Tul. L. R. 89
(1957).
92 Belfield v. Coop, 8 IMI. 2d 293, 134 N. E. 2d 249 (1956).
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Based upon the above procedure, the possibility of making
what is known as a "talking movie" of the signing of a will where
the facts or size of the estate warrant it, intrigues me.
Another precaution-never have a beneficiary within "ear-
shot" at the time of the execution of the will, for certainly on con-
test the allegation would be made of "undue influence."
Wills should never be executed in duplicate, for the reten-
tion of one and the loss of the other might give rise to a refusal
to probate on the grounds that the will was revoked.93 The last
will is the one which, in the sense of time, is executed the latest.
This could mean then that the carbon copy is in fact the last will.
A recommended procedure is to have the two copies of the
will conformed after it has been executed by typing in all of the
handwriting which appears on the original. One of such con-
formed copies is to be given to the client to be kept at home for
review and the other retained in the attorney's office. The original
generally is kept by the client in a safe deposit box.
When a very slight change is involved or where there is not
sufficient time in which to prepare a new will, codicils may be
utilized as temporary measures which are subsequently to be re-
placed by a new will. Do not use a codicil when it will disappoint
some legatee or devisee, since the original testament will show
the testator's original intention. Avoid "as a plague" the making
of a codicil whenever a major change is being made in a will, for
the obvious reason that the difficulty of interpretation becomes
doubled. However, if in the original will charitable bequests
have been made, the scrivener should advise his client, if he has
issue or adopted children or lineal descendants of either, that the
making of a new will will invalidate the gifts to charities should
he die within one year after its execution.9 4 In such a case, a
codicil, regardless of a major change, might be the only solution,
for it has been held in Ohio that a codicil executed within one
year of the testator's death revoking bequests and thereby in-
creasing residue, is valid.95 In any case, for convenience's sake,
try to have the same witnesses for the codicil as for the original
will.
If your client is in fear of impending death and desires to
make gifts to charities, it might be well to consider the creation
of an inter vivos trust which is not subject to the mortmain
statute.9 6
Even though a will has been carefully considered and drawn,
it needs to be periodically checked over to see if any change in
the law or in the circumstances of the testator require an altera-
tion in the estate plan. If a person will visit his dentist semi-an-
93 In re Woods, 61 Ohio L. Abs. 548, 105 N. E. 2d 589 (1951).
94 Ohio Rev. Code, Sec. 2107.06.
95 Ruple v. Hiram College, 35 Ohio App. 8, 171 N. E. 367 (1928).
96 Ohio Rev. Code, Sec. 2107.06; also Cleveland Trust Company v. White, 134
Ohio St. 1, 15 N. E. 2d 627 (1938).
18https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol8/iss2/13
CLEVELAND-MARSHALL LAW REVIEW
nually to protect the health of his teeth, he certainly ought to
discuss his estate plan with his lawyer at least every two years to
protect its "health."
Periodic revision of a will is a natural, important function.
Wills should be reviewed just as one reviews the balance sheet of
a business.
Section 1 of Rule XXVIII of the Supreme Court of Ohio,
"Rules of Professional Conduct," adopts the Canons of Ethics of
the American Bar Association. Although Section 2 of Rule
XXVII provides that an attorney shall not solicit professional
employment, Opinion 21 of the American Bar Association, March
15, 1941, Reconsidered and Approved June, 1942, states: "Where
the lawyer has no reason to believe that he has been supplanted
by another lawyer, it is not only his right, but it might even be
his duty to advise his client of any change of fact or law which
might defeat the client's testamentary purpose as expressed in
his will. Periodic notices might be sent to the client for whom
a lawyer has drawn a will suggesting that it might be wise for
the client to reexamine his will to determine whether or not there
has been any change in his situation requiring a modification of
his will." The opinion even states the reasons back of its state-
ment that such advice is not improper. These are legally sig-
nificant events which occur between the execution of the will and
the death of the testator. Their consequences should manifestly
be pointed out to the testator by his lawyer because otherwise
the testator may not be aware of the seriousness of these changes
in the law or fact.
Many of the advantages of good drafting and estate planning
mentioned in this article can be demonstrated by the lawyer to
his clients. As a result, their attitude will be changed from one
which begrudges a small fee for what they think is a legal steno-
graphic job to a feeling that they are getting a bargain in paying
liberally for a plan that will protect their savings during the
future years.
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